Abstract: The evidence of laboratory experiments of behavioral economists shows that individuals behave reciprocally. These data put into question the pure self-interest thesis of human motivation of the homo oeconomicus model and call for alternative models. Focusing on the explanation of reciprocal behavior in Trust Games, this article proposes two directions that economists and other social scientists might want to consider in order to establish a more solid foundation for economic theory. First, it presents models that economic theorists developed to explain the laboratory evidence of reciprocal behavior. It highlights that all of these models subscribe to the Humean view that desires are at the source of any human motivation and suggests an alternative Kantian model where reasons have the capacity to motivate human action. Second, it emphasizes that a supplementary examination of the social background conditions would illuminate the analysis of the ndings because of the connection between thè local' and society-wide demands of reciprocity.
Introduction
For a long time the belief that all individuals are, or can assumed to be, motivated by pure self-interest has enjoyed the status of an axiom, and even a dogma, in economics.
1 Since the 1980s, however, the results of experimental economists began increasingly to challenge this fundamental motivational assumption of standard economic theory. In numerous laboratory experiments throughout the world, test subjects participated in various types of games that allowed them to gain real pecuniary payos. They turned out to behave in ways that cannot be properly explained by the pure self-interest thesis of human behavior.
In games like the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Trust Game, the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game, some players consistently chose actions and strategies that are described more properly as altruistic, fair, or reciprocal behavior rather than purely self-interested behavior: despite the fact that there was a dominant strategy for purely self-interested players that was easily identiable, players repeatedly did not choose it. This result has prevailed under varying * The authors would like to thank Nicole Hassoun, Michael Münch and Timothy Waligore for comments on a penultimate version of this article.
1 Purely self-interested behavior may under certain circumstances be also described as selsh', and thus as morally doubtful, but not every purely self-interested behavior, such as taking one's favorite path through the woods, is selsh (cf. Leist 2005, 160) . setups of the experiment. Thus, other motives must be considered in order to explain the altruistic, fair or reciprocal behavior of the players in the laboratory experiments (cf. Fehr/Schmidt 2006 for an overview of the empirical evidence and the novel theoretical explanations). Other types of empirical research, of course, also put into question the pure self-interest assumption. Anthropological research, for instance, has done so by emphasizing the role of reciprocity in social relationships (cf. Mauss 1990 (cf. Mauss [1923 ). This article examines the phenomenon of reciprocity, but focuses exclusively on the laboratory evidence of reciprocal behavior in Trust Games.
The aim of this article is to suggest two paths that economists and other social scientists might want to take so as to create robust models of human behavior for economic theory. In particular, it sheds light on the motivation to behave reciprocally as well as on the relation between the demands of reciprocity in`local' interactions and the society at large. Sections 2 through 6
highlight that explanatory models usually assume that human motivation always has a desire at its source and propose to further investigate other models where reasons have the capacity to motivate human action. More specically, in section 2 this article will show why exactly the pure self-interest thesis fails to explain the laboratory evidence of the players' actual behavior in Trust Games.
Sections 3 and 4 introduce explanatory models that economists created in order to theoretically account for the evidence of the Trust Games. In section 5 these models are shown to subscribe to a Humean theory of motivation and a related Neo-Humean Model of Practical Reason. Section 6 introduces an alternate model, the Kantian Model of Practical Reason, and then elucidates how this latter model explains reciprocal behavior in Trust Games. Section 6 nally also elaborates how such a model could be integrated into rational choice theory.
Section 7 draws attention to the fact that (reciprocal) behavior in`local' interactions, i.e. interactions among two or a few people that are part of the same society, may be aected by the particular shape of the social background conditions of such local interactions. In particular, it points to the signicance of the society-wide demands of reciprocity for the analysis of the evidence of reciprocal behavior. Therefore, it also suggests to further investigate the social background conditions of the laboratory experiments. Section 8 comes to a conclusion.
Experimental Evidence for Reciprocal Behavior
The most frequently used experimental game to analyze reciprocal behavior is the Trust Game (or Investment Game). Two agents, a rst-mover and a secondmover, play the Trust Game. At the beginning of the game, the rst-mover decides how much of an initial endowment she wants to send to the secondmover. The amount sent is tripled before reaching the second-mover. Then the second-mover decides how much of the received amount she wants to send back to the rst-mover. The nal payo of the rst-mover is the amount she did not send to the second mover plus the amount the second-mover sends back to her; the nal payo of the second-mover is the amount received minus the amount she sent back to the rst-mover. Economists usually refer to the amount sent by the rst-mover as a measure of`trust', and the amount returned by the second-mover as a measure of`trustworthiness' or`reciprocity'.
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If we assume that both agents are purely self-interested (i.e. that agents only care about their personal payos), then the Trust Game involves a socialdilemma. The total sum of the players' nal payos is maximal if and only if the rst-mover sends her entire endowment to the second-mover (since each monetary unit (MU) sent from the rst-mover adds two MUs to the total payo, as described above). However, if the second-mover is purely self-interested, she has no incentive to send anything back. Given that she keeps everything for herself, it is rational for the rst-mover not to send anything to the secondmover. Standard rational choice theory therefore predicts that agents keep their initial endowment and no amounts are sent between rst-and second-mover.
This outcome is clearly inecient for the players.
The rst economists who analyzed the Trust Game experimentally with student subjects were Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) . What they found diers substantially from the prediction that is based on pure self-interest. On average, rst-movers send 50 percent of their endowment, which indicates a signicant degree of`trust'. The average amount returned by second-movers is 95 percent of what was sent by rst-movers.
3 Therefore, many second-movers reciprocate the rst-movers' investments. This nding was conrmed in many subsequent studies that analyzed the Trust Game experimentally (see Camerer 2003 for a summary).
Reciprocal behavior has also been observed in other experimental games with structures similar to the Trust Game. In Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) , rst-movers, labeled as`rms', oer a xed wage to second-movers, labeled as workers'. After accepting such an oer, a second-mover then can exert costly eort. The rst-mover's payo increases in eort, while the second-mover's payo decreases in eort. Any eort exerted by the second-mover leads to a gain in social eciency. Once again, standard rational choice theory would predict that in the absence of reputation-eects second-movers do not exert any effort, and hence rst-movers oer the lowest possible wage. However, it turned out that rst-movers oeredon average`generous' wages and second-movers' eort increaseson averagein the oered wage. This provides additional evidence that many individuals behave reciprocally.
Early Explanations for Reciprocal Behavior in Economics
The experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior rejects the hypothesis of pure self-interest. It provoked economic theorists to come up with models that are 2 In the following the article adopts these meanings of the terms`trust' and`reciprocity', or`reciprocal behavior', in order to refer to these types of behavior of the players in the Trust
Game.
3 The variation is large: half of the subjects return either nothing or very little.
compatible with the experimental data. An obvious alternative to pure selfinterested preferences that rank outcomes only according to one's own payos, are`altruistic preferences' that also include the payos of others. However, such preferences have been found to be not very robust. In particular, they cannot account for`negative reciprocity', which means that many individuals are willing to sacrice their own payos in order to punish the purely self-interested behavior of others.
4 For example, Fehr and Gächter (2000) show experimentally that individuals punish free riders in a public-good game, although this punishment is costly for them and does not create future benets. In response, theorists invented the notion of`inequity-aversion' (Fehr/Schmidt 1999; Bolton/Ockenfels 2000) . Inequity-averse individuals have two objectives: to maximize their own payos and to minimize the dierence between their own and others' payos.
The weight of these two objectives is determined by certain xed parameters.
Note that inequity-averse individuals may be willing to sacrice their own payos in order to reduce the payo dierential. Hence, they exhibit both positive and negative reciprocity.
Altruistic and inequity-averse preferences rank the outcomes only according to their payo distribution. There is, however, substantial evidence that individuals also take into account the intentions of their opponents (Rabin 1993 ; and dicult to apply to games with a richer structure than the Trust Game.
4`P ositive reciprocity', by contrast, means the costly rewarding of not purely self-interested behavior by others.
Recent Approaches in Economics
A number of classical and contemporary thinkers hypothesized that the desire to be esteemed by others is a basic source of motivation (cf. Brennan/Pettit 2004).
5 Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) formalize social esteem as the other's belief about one's own`type'. They construct a model that assumes two types of agents, relatively altruistic and relatively self-interested ones. An agent's type is not transparent to others, but agents can signal their type through actions:
by behaving reciprocally they can signal that they are the altruistic type and change the other's belief. An agent's utility increases when the other agent attaches a higher probability to the possibility that she is an altruistic type.
Hence, reciprocal behavior may increase the agent's social esteem.
Related to the notion of social esteem is the concept of`self-image'. Accord- Alternatively, individuals may also have a desire to conform to the behavior of others. Sliwka (2007) models the interaction between a principal and a pool of agents. The principal, the rst-mover, can trust or control the agents, the second-movers. Trusting is the principal's optimal choice if most agents will in fact reciprocate this trust. Some agents are`conformists'. Their utility is maximal if they act in the same manner as the majority of agents. When the principal trusts the agents, this can be a signal for conformists that a majority of the agents behaves reciprocally. Otherwise, it would not pay o for the principal to trust. This in turn leads conformists to reciprocate the principal's trust.
The Neo-Humean Model of Practical Reason as Explanation for Reciprocal Behavior
This section will now illustrate how the models employed to explain reciprocal behavior in Trust Games are generally based on a Neo-Humean Model of Practical Reason (NHMPR). First it characterizes the NHMPR and its understanding of the relation between reasons for action and motivation in some more detail.
Then it will show the particular ways in which the previously introduced models subscribe to the NHMPR.
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The desire for social esteem is distinct from the desire for social recognition. 8 Thereby, the NHMPR also fullls the normative requirement that reasons for action must justify an action. The reasons for action not only explainthrough the identication of specic motives, i.e. the motivating reasons of the agentwhy an agent pursued an action, but they also justify why it was rational to pursue it. So within the NHMPR an action can be justied as rational from the rst-person standpoint of the agent by demonstrating that the action was the optimal means for realizing her desires.
The NHMPR defends an internalist view about reasons for action. Following Williams (1981) , the debate between internalism and externalism departs from the question of how to interpret the statement`having a reason to x ' (x simply stands for some verb of action). Internalism holds that if it is true that there is a reason for person P to x, then person P has a motive that is served or furthered by x ing. This implies that if person P has no such motive, it cannot have a reason to x. Externalism, by contrast, claims that the statement`a person has a reason to x ' does not have as truth condition that person P has a motive that is served or furthered by x ing. Internalism about reasons is driven by the idea that if reasons for actions are to explain why an agent pursues a particular action, then it is necessary that those reasons constitute a motive for the agent to act in that particular way. As the NHMPR derives reasons for actions from the desires of the agents to whom the reasons apply, it is thereby guaranteed that these reasons provide a motive for the agent. By contrast, externalism 6 The next paragraph draws on Gosepath 1999. 7 In an inuential article Korsgaard labeled this motivational requirement the internalism requirement (Korsgaard 1986, 11). 8 Note that this way of construing the NHMPR goes beyond mere instrumental rationality. It represents prudential rationality or Zweckrationalität (Weber [1985] 1921, 13) as the reasons for action that guide an agent in her behavior reect a weighting of the alternative ends she has.
about reasons for action does not hold that if person P has reasons to x, then person P also has a motive to x. The upshot is that one cannot say that person P x ed because of the reasons that person P had to x. For person P may not have had a motive to x since the`external' reasons that applied to person P did not imply a motive to x. Thus, it might be impossible to explain the x ing of person P, because such an explanation would require the identication of the presence of a motive (cf. Korsgaard 1986, 11) . Hence, many dismiss externalism on the ground that it lacks an account of the reasons for action. This issue will be taken up again in section 6.
Early and Recent Economic Models to Explain Reciprocal
Behavior and the NHMPR
The following paragraphs elucidate that early and recent economic models of explaining reciprocal behavior subscribe to the NHMPR. All these models hold that reasons for action are based on desires.
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Some of the early models in economics explain the reciprocal behavior of some agents in the Trust Game by referring to the`altruistic preferences' and the`inequity aversion' of these agents. Here, the reciprocal behavior represents the appropriate means to realize certain desires of the agent, be it the preference for another player's higher payo or the preference for a more equal payo distribution. In this way, the`altruistic preference' and the`inequity aversion' model subscribe to the NHMPR, as it is the agent's desire for a specic payo distribution that together with a certain means-ends belief motivate and serve as a justication for her to pursue a reciprocal action. Even in the intention-based model of reciprocity, where some second-movers are said to take into account the intentions of the rst-movers, it is also a desirethe desire to reward kind and punish unkind behaviorthat ultimately motivates the second-movers' behavior. Thus, this model also endorses the NHMPR as a desire to reward kind and punish unkind behavior and a belief about which action is to realize this desire explain and justify the reciprocal behavior.
The recent economic models of reciprocal behavior also tend to follow the NHMPR. In these models as well the second-mover is led eventually by a desire to act reciprocally. In the social esteem model the agent aspires social esteem and therefore acts reciprocally so as to gain the esteem of the rst-mover. So the desire for social esteem, in conjunction with the belief that reciprocal behavior in the Trust Game leads to social esteem, cause and justify the action.
The`self-image' model explains reciprocal behavior by pointing to the desire to act consistently with the self-image that one has of oneself so as to reduce the dierence between one's values and actions. This means that reciprocal action results from an agent's desire to conform to her self-image and her belief that this action is an eective means to fulll this desire. Hence the NHMPR operates here as well. Finally, Sliwka's approach to explaining reciprocal behavior in the 9 In a dierent terminology, this is to say that all these models perceive economics' approach to choice as the optimization of a utility function and therefore subscribe to a NHMPR. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
Trust Game also belongs to the category of the NHMPR: The second-movers, the agents, act reciprocally because of their desire to behave in conformity with the majority of the pool of second-movers and the belief that the rst-mover's, the principal's, trust reveals that the majority of the second-movers will reciprocate the trust.
The Kantian Model of Practical Reason as Explanation for Reciprocal Behavior
The NHMPR can be contrasted with an alternative Kantian Model of Practical Reason (KMPR), which has so far not been given due consideration in the theoretical discussion of the phenomenon of reciprocal behavior in Trust Games.
After presenting the KMPR and clarifying how it explains reciprocal behavior in Trust Games, this section elaborates how experimental economists and other social scientists can incorporate it into their theories.
The Kantian Model of Practical Reason
The KMPR rejects the idea that reasons for action must have certain desires at their source. If reasons for action are not based on desires, then the KMPRor so it seemsholds an externalist view on reasons for action. Externalism subscribes to the thesis that justicatory reasons for action, as external reasons, do not need to be tied to the subjective motivational set (Williams 1981, 102 ) of the agent. It also arms that the truth of normative reasons does not need to be capable of motivating the agent to whom the reasons apply to act accordingly. This leads to the peculiar situation where, as outlined above, an agent has normative reasons for an action, although these normative reasons are insufcient to motivate the action and thus are not capable of explaining the action.
Hence it is dicult to see how externalism about reasons could underlie a model of practical reason that takes into account the normative and the descriptive dimensions of practical reason.
Therefore it is important to realize that there is conceptual space for the KMPR within an internalist account of reasons for action understood as the claim that`having a reason to x ' means that the person has a motive that is served or furthered by x ing.
10 The KMPR simply denies that serving or furthering a motive by x ing means that the motivation was generated by a desire. Indeed, the KMPR can argue that reasons for action need not be derived from a desire, although these reasons are to motivate the agent. Thus the KMPR claims to fulll the motivational requirement i.e. that reasons for action are to be capable of motivating. Hence, the crucial dierence between the NHMPR and the KMPR is not whether or not reasons for action are to motivate an agent both models can endorse this claim. Rather, the dierence between these models lies in how they respond to the question as to what comprises the source of the 10 The KMPR is construed here as a conception of practical rationality as`weak internalism', as Gosepath 1992, 231, denes it.
motivation (Gosepath 1999, 16 ). The KMPR, as opposed to the NHMPR, puts forward the thesis that reasons can be at the source of a motivation for an action, but nevertheless can grant that an agent always satises a desire when performing it. In other words, the KMPR does not need to deny that a desire is present when an agent pursues an action, but argues that the desire itself is not the motive that is the motivating reason for the action.
Nagel cashed out this idea very clearly by distinguishing between motivated and unmotivated desires (Nagel 1978, 29) . Motivated desires are those desires that a person has after a certain process of deliberation. These desires are not simply given to an agent in the sense that the agent merely perceives to have certain desires. Rather, these desires emerge from a process of reasoningthe result of which is the presence of a certain desire that consequentially will also motivate the agent to act in its pursuit. An agent, for instance, may have the motivated desire to prepare for an exam as she realizes that this will increase her chances of passing it. Unmotivated desires, on the other hand, are desires that the agent simply contemplates without further reection. The desire to drink water, for instance, might simply occur to an agent although the agent did not think about whether or not she was thirsty in the rst place. And more importantly, a motivated desire may, but need not be itself motivated by further desires of a dierent kind. Thereby some desires of the agent's subjective motivational set can generatevia a sound deliberative route (Williams 1995, 35) other desires that then count as motivated desires. It is characteristic of the KMPR, however, that not all motivated desires are reducible to other desires. Rather, some desires are motivated by reasons which themselves are not dependent upon any particular desire of the agent to whom the reasons apply.
6.2 Explaining Reciprocal Behavior with the KMPR
The KMPR enables to explain reciprocal behavior dierently than the NHMPR and thus may constitute the basis for further explanatory accounts of the laboratory data. It can explain the reciprocal behavior in the following way. The second-mover acts reciprocally, because she thinks that reasons apply to her that do not allow her to act otherwise. Some second-movers, after all, may hold that reciprocating the trust of the rst-mover in the Trust Game is a norm that no one could reasonably reject under such circumstances and thus constitutes a binding reason to act accordingly (Scanlon 1981, 110; cf. also Forst 1994, 64) .
Thereby, reciprocal behavior is considered to be a principled commitment to a particular type of action that does not have a desire of the agent at its source.
In other words, the second-mover may recognize certain (moral) reasons that lead her to the judgment that it is her moral obligation to behave reciprocally.
While a second-mover who believes that she has an obligation to act reciprocally may form a desire to act reciprocally, an explanation that would consider this desire to be fundamental would fail to identify the actual cause for the 11 Alternately, one may hold the view that desires only rarely provide reasons for action.
This view maintains that almost all actions are to be explained with reference to motivating reasons that do not depend on desires (cf. Scanlon 1999, ch. 1).
reciprocal action. The explanation must start with the reasons that the secondmover perceived as (moral) reasons that could not be reasonably rejected and move from there to the desire which the agent formed in response to these reasons. Using Nagel's terminology the desire to act reciprocally is a motivated desire which itself is not necessarily reducible to other pre-existing desires of the subjective motivational set of the second-mover. Therefore the KMPR opens up a further explanatory approach of the reciprocal behavior encountered in the Trust Games that so far has received little attention.
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Note that this account of the motivation to behave reciprocally diers signif- Moreover, experimental economics can show that a change in motivating reasons can trigger a change in behavior. A good example is the recent work of Benjamin, Choi and Fisher (2010) . They study the impact of religious norms on economic behavior, by making these norms more salient to a randomly selected sample of student subjects. In the psychological literature, this technique has come to be known as`priming'. The experimental results indicate that for some primed subjects the religious norm becomes a motivating reason. They show, for instance, that primed Protestants contribute more to a public good than their non-primed counterparts. This provides not only evidence for the fact that individuals' preferences are not stable, but also demonstrates how their behavior changes with motivating reasons. So, apparently, the motivation for this behavior has a reason rather than a desire at its source.
So far the article argued that early and recent models to explain reciprocal behavior rely on the NHMPR. Furthermore, it has suggested that the consideration of the KMPR might be an attractive basis for further attempts to explain the reciprocal behavior in Trust Games. The next section makes another, second proposal as to how models that explain reciprocal could be amended.
Reciprocal Behavior and Social Background Conditions
It is a striking feature of the laboratory experiments that they are interpreted in abstraction from the socio-cultural contexts in which the data are collected. This is remarkable because the eect of culture on economic outcomes is empirically well-established (cf. Guiso et al. 2006 for a summary; cf. Knack/Kneefer 1997 on the economic impact of dierent degrees of`self-reported trust'). Moreover,
there is also evidence that shows that behavior in economic games varies signicantly across economically dierent countries (cf. Cardenas/Carpenter 2008) and culturally distinct groups (cf. Henrich et al. 2004 ). Thus, socio-cultural contexts apparently aect the results of the laboratory experiments. This has led some to make the point that structural explanations have to be supplemented to the analysis of the behavior in the laboratory experiments (Leist 2005, 168170 
Alternative Understandings of Reciprocity's Demands
The general concept of reciprocity, i.e. to return good in proportion to the good we receive (cf. Becker 1986, 3) , leaves fully unspecied the substantive account of proportionality by reference to which reciprocal behavior could be identied.
To illustrate, consider three alternative points of view about what reciprocity demands of the second-mover in the Trust Game. From the rst point of view, reciprocity demands that the second-mover returns the same amount of MUs that the rst-mover sent (before it was tripled) back to the rst-mover. The rationale is that because the tripling of the amount sent by the rst-mover is not caused by the choice of the rst-mover, but is a specic feature of the setup of the Trust Game, the eect of the tripling is therefore not attributable to the rst-mover and does not need to be reciprocated. On the second point of view, a splitting of the amount of MUs that the second-mover receives in addition to her initial endowment is the proper understanding of reciprocity's demands. The idea here is that since it is only due to the rst-mover's choice to send MUs that the secondmover receives more MUs than her initial endowment, an equal sharing of the MUs that the second-mover receives expresses the demands of reciprocity. From yet another point of view, reciprocity requires that the rst-and second-mover dispose over the same amount of MUs in the nal payo structure. As from the second point of view, reciprocity demands an equal distribution, but this time the entire stock of MUs is to be shared equally. (Rawls 2001, 6) . Therefore, the notion of reciprocity is the central normative source of Rawls's conception of justice as fairness. Accordingly, as Gibbard puts it nicely, for Rawls justice is fairness in exchange, but on a grand scale: it is fairness in the terms governing a society-wide system of reciprocity (Gibbard 1991, 266 ). Rawls's conception of justice can hence also be labeled as`Justice as
Reciprocity' (Gibbard 1991; cf. also Buchanan 1990) . Social justice means that society's members reciprocate the other members' abidance to the rules of fair terms of cooperation by supporting these rules themselves.
14 From a Rawlsian perspective, the entire system of cooperation that a society constitutes is subject to the demands of reciprocity. 
Conclusion
The ndings of experimental economists seriously challenge the pure self-interest thesis of human motivation and continue to evoke new explanatory models to explicate the laboratory data that are generated by a broad variety of economic games. This article showed that both early and recent economic models to explain reciprocal behavior in Trust Games rely on the NHMPR. The NHMPR is distinct in that it claims that a desire is always at the source of a motivation.
This model was contrasted to the KMPR that ascribes to reasons the capacity to motivate action. The KMPR can also explain the reciprocal behavior in Trust Games and recently eorts have been made to develop a reason-based theory of rational choice. So the KMPR may be an attractive alternative to the NHMPR. Finally, the article highlighted the relation between local and societywide demands of reciprocity and suggested that further examinations of the social background conditions of the laboratory experiments would prove valu-
